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This paper examines how import competition from different origins and the presence of 
product differentiation affect market power of Swedish manufacturing firms during the 
1990s. Applying Roeger’s method (1995), I perform the empirical analysis based on 
detailed firm-level data and estimate an average mark-up level of Swedish 
manufacturing firms. 
  The general finding is that imports from both European countries and other high-
income countries outside Europe impose disciplinary effects on price-cost margin of 
Swedish manufacturing firms. The strongest effect is from the recent EU member 
countries. However, the competitive pressure associated with import is relaxed in the 
presence of product differentiation. 
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The link between international trade and market power has been 
extensively investigated in a large body of empirical work. Import 
competition on the domestic market has been seen as a disciplinary device 
to constrain market power of domestic firms, and numerous studies have 
provided evidence of a disciplinary effect imposed by import competition.
1 
For a small open economy, like Sweden, the impact of import 
competition is highly relevant for the development of manufacturing 
sectors. Furthermore, important institutional changes have taken place in 
the 1990s, namely the launch of the EU’s internal market in 1992 and 
Sweden’s EU membership in 1995. 
When the link between international trade and market power is 
examined, the Lerner index is the most commonly used measure for 
monopolistic power. The Lerner index is defined as (p − m)/p, where p is 
price and m is marginal cost. Since the marginal cost is not observable, an 
average price-cost margin (PCM) approach that uses average cost instead 
of marginal cost is frequently applied.
2 However, the average price-cost 
approach suffers in general from endogeneity bias due to the simultaneity 
among input, output, profitability and productivity. Furthermore, the 
validity of the average cost PCM measure is challenged because of the 
instable time-series relationship between accounting profit and PCM due to 
measurement errors in fixed costs.
3 With an alternative methodology, 
developed by Roeger (1995), it is feasible to estimate marginal cost mark-
ups consistently by using OLS.
4 
In this paper I apply Roeger’s method to estimate mark-ups to assess the 
market power of Swedish manufacturing firms in the 1990s using firm-
level data. I compare my estimates with former mark-up estimates on 
Swedish manufacturing using industry level data, as well as estimates on 
other small and open economies also using firm-level data. 
                                                 
1 For instance, Levinsohn (1993), Harrison (1994), Kattics and Petersen (1994), Krishna 
and Mitra (1998), Konings and Vandenbusssche (2002), Konings et al. (2001, 2003). 
Tybout (2001) gives a more detailed survey of the existing empirical literature, in 
particular on micro-level studies. 
2The price-cost margin is defined as  added value payroll added value PCM / ) ( − = .Several 
studies on Swedish manufacturing, using both industry and firm data, have applied such 
a measure, e.g. Stålhammar (1991), Hansson (1992) and Lundin (2003). 
3 Bresnahan (1987) argues forcefully on this point. 
4 Recently, the method has been frequently used, e.g. Konings et al. (2001, 2002, 2003) 
on manufacturing in Belgium, the Netherlands and on a number of transition economies, 




Moreover, I investigate the impact of imports and product differentiation 
on mark-ups. Bernhofen (2001) argues that when product differentiation is 
linked to the intensity of import penetration, a high degree of product 
differentiation encourages firms to increase their supplies to the domestic 
and the foreign markets. Hence, the volume of intra-industry trade is 
positively related to the degree of product differentiation.
5 Theoretically, 
product differentiation thus leads to monopolistic competition and intra-
industry trade that may reduce the disciplinary effect imposed by import 
competition. Since R&D investments are large and the share of intra-
industry trade is high in Swedish manufacturing, we would expect to 
observe a high degree of product differentiation. Nevertheless, this 
dimension has not been taken into account in previous studies of the 
disciplinary effect of imports in Swedish manufacturing. 
To preview my results, I find that import competition has affected mark-
ups in Swedish manufacturing firms during the 1990s. There is a 
disciplinary effect of import competition from EU countries and high-
income countries outside Europe. However, product differentiation appears 
to relax the competitive pressure of imports. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2, I introduce Roeger’s 
method to estimate price-cost margins and discuss some methodological 
issues. Section 3 presents the data and gives some descriptive facts on 
sectoral characteristics and the development of import penetration in 
Swedish manufacturing in the 1990s. Section 4 contains the empirical 












                                                 
5 Bernhofen (2001) also shows that the positive relationship between product 
differentiation and intra-industry trade is robust to various modes of oligopolistic 





Let me first briefly describe and discuss the method developed by Roeger 
(1995), which I apply to estimate price-cost margins. The method starts out 
from a standard production function of a firm i at time t 
 
( ) it it it it i it it M U S K F A Q , , , =                                                (1)     
 
where Q is output, K is capital, S is skilled and U is unskilled labour, and M 
is material input. A denotes the technological level and I assume Hicks-
neutral technical change. 
Under the assumption of constant returns to scale, the primal Solow 
residual SR can be expressed as:
6 
 
() = − − − − − − − = it iMt it iUt it iSt it iMt iUt iSt it it M U S K Q SR ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 ˆ θ θ θ θ θ θ  
() ( ) it it it it it K Q A ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 − + − β β                                                                     (2) 
 
X ˆ  is relative change in X.  it A ˆ  is technical change and  Jit θ  is the share of 
factor J ( M U S K J , , , = ) in total revenue.  it β  is the Lerner index, which is 











=                                                           (3)   
Hence, the primal (quantity) residual is a weighted average of the 
technical change and the rate of change in capital productivity, and the 
Lerner index determines the weights. 
By using the cost function that corresponds to the production function in 
Equation (1), we can derive the dual (price-based) Solow residual SRP: 
 
 
() = − + + + − − − = it iMt iMt iUt iUt iSt iSt iKt iMt iUt iSt it p w w w w SRP ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 θ θ θ θ θ θ  
() ( ) iKt it it it it w p A ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 − − − β β                                               (4)   
                                                 
6 Appendix 1 presents a detailed derivation of the expression for the primal Solow 




iJt w ˆ  and  it p ˆ  are the relative changes in the price of factor J and the output 
price. As in Equation (2), the dual (price-based) Solow residual SRP is a 
weighted average of the technical change and the rate of change in output 
prices minus the rate of change in capital costs. The weights are determined 
by the Lerner index as well.  
The basic idea of Roeger’s method is that the difference between the 
primal and the dual Solow residuals is due to imperfect competition in the 
product market. Subtracting  it SRP  from  it SR  yields: 
 
()
) ˆ ˆ ( ) ˆ ˆ (
) ˆ ˆ ( ) ˆ ˆ ( 1 ) ˆ ˆ (
iMt it iMt iUt it iUt
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              [ ] ) ˆ ˆ ( ) ˆ ˆ ( iKt it it it it w K p Q + − + = β                                                                  (5) 
                                        
By letting  it Y ∆  denote the expression on the left hand side,  it X ∆  the 
expression within the brackets on the right hand side, and adding an error 
term  it ε , we obtain: 
it it it it X Y ε β + ∆ = ∆                                                        (6) 
 
This is the baseline model that I estimate in the coming empirical 
analysis. The most appealing feature of this methodology is its simplicity. 
When the productivity (technical change) term is cancelled out, as shown 
above in Equation (5), price-cost margins can be estimated consistently by 
using OLS. Furthermore, this method requires only nominal variables, and 
thus it helps to overcome measurement errors owing to lack of detailed 
price data. Despite these advantageous features associated with Roeger’s 
methodology, there are some critical theoretical and empirical issues that 
need to be discussed before moving on to the estimations. 
Theoretically, Roeger’s methodology relies on the assumption of 
constant returns to scale. This restrictive assumption leads, as shown by 
Basu and Fernald (1997), to upward (downward) bias in the mark-up 
estimation depending on decreasing (increasing) returns to scale. 
Notwithstanding, the potential bias that may emerge in the presence of non-
constant returns to scale I have still chosen to stick to Roeger’s 
straightforward method to estimate mark-ups. 
Empirical estimates of returns to scale are somewhat mixed. Haskel et al. 




German manufacturing. The result in Basu and Fernald (1997) using US 
manufacturing data indicates that firm-level returns to scale are constant or 
slightly decreasing, while Klette (1999), which analyses Norwegian 
manufacturing, implies decreasing returns to scale. Also Kee (2002), which 
relaxes both the assumptions of constant returns to scale and perfect 
competition in a study of Singapore’s manufacturing, finds evidence of 
decreasing returns to scale, as well as of market power. 
  The non-zero error term in Equation (6) may cause problems for 
consistent estimation. The error term is supposed to be zero given that the 
productivity term is cancelled out in the derivation. However, as discussed 
in Roeger (1995) and in other empirical applications of his method, e.g. 
Konings et al. (2002) and Görg and Warzynski (2003), measurement errors 
in production factors are potential sources for a non-zero term. 
Measurement errors in capital stocks  it K  are of particular concern. The 
book values of capital stock in the balance sheets of enterprise are used in 
the estimations and I employ firm-specific depreciation rates to construct 
the firm-specific rental prices of capital  iKt w .
7 To assess potential 
measurement errors in the book-value capital stocks, I have computed an 
alternative capital stock measure by applying a perpetual inventory 
method.
8 The correlation between this alternative capital stock measure and 
the book-value capital stock is high (0.82), which indicates that these 
measures are very similar. One drawback with the perpetual inventory 
method is that it suffers more from the missing value problem; as soon as 
data on net investment is lacking the accumulation is stopped. Since these 
two measures are so similar, I prefer to use the book values of capital stock 
in the mark-up estimations because then I get a larger dataset.
9 
Another potential source of measurement errors is the labour input. The 
labour input used in this study is the number of skilled and unskilled 
employees at the firm level and not hours worked by different skill 
categories. Yet, according to Konings et al. (2003), this measurement error 
does not cause problems for the estimation since the labour input appears 
only on the left hand side of Equation (6). On the other hand, the 
inflexibility of the labour market in response to demand shifts in the 
product market results in labour hoarding that may cause more concern. 
                                                 
7 Appendix 2 shows how the rental price of capital has been constructed. 
8 Hansson and Lundin (2003) contains a description of the generation of this capital 
stock. 
9 The difference in the number of observations by using these two capital stock 
measures is 776. Yet, I have estimated all the models in the following sections by using 




This might be particularly valid in the highly centralised and unionised 
labour market in Sweden. As in earlier empirical applications, I include 




3.  Data and variables 
 
The data are from Statistics Sweden and have been complied into a 
microeconomic database at Trade Union Institute for Economic Research 
(FIEF). From the annual financial reports of the enterprise, data on sales, 
capital stocks, wage bills and costs of material are obtained. Using data 
from the register-based labour market statistics (RAMS), I am able to 
divide firm-level wage bills into wage bills of skilled and unskilled 
labour.
10 The dataset consists of all manufacturing firms larger than 50 
employees for the period 1990-1999.
11 This leaves me with a panel of 3197 
unique firms belonging to 93 manufacturing industries at the 3-digit level 
of the SNI92 classification.
12 The firm-specific rental price of capital has to 
be derived and I present detailed information on the construction of this 
variable in Appendix 2. 
One might expect that the impact of imports on the mark-ups will vary 
depending on the country of origin. For instance, the integration among the 
former 15 EU members has, due to similarities in income and factor 
endowments, resulted mainly in intra-industry trade, driven by product 
differentiation and economies of scale, and intra-firm trade, owing to the 
increasing importance of multinational enterprises. Hence, it is reasonable 
to presume less competitive impact of imports originating from these 
countries than of imports from more dissimilar countries (Jacquemin and 
Sapir 1991). Of particular interest for the future European integration is the 
effect of imports from the 10 recent EU members. Hansson (1992) found 
quite a large disciplinary impact of imports from Japan and Asian NICs on 
the market power of domestic Swedish manufacturing firms in the 1980s. 
Does this pattern remain in the 1990s? These are the reasons, in the 
regression analysis in Section 4 for allowing for differential disciplinary 
                                                 
10 I define skilled labour as employees with a post-secondary education, i.e. with more 
than 12 years of schooling. 
11 Manufacturing firms with less than 50 employees are excluded because of problems 
with missing values in export, capital stock and net investment. This might lead to an 
upward bias in the estimated mark-ups due to the exclusion of small firms. 
12 Table A2.1 in Appendix 2 presents more information on the panel. Actually, I am 




effects of imports from the following five country groups: (i) EU 14 former 
members (excluding Sweden), (ii) EU 10 recent members, (iii) Japan and 
Asian NICs, (iv) other high-income countries, and (v) other low-income 
countries.
 13 
Import data by industry and trading partners together with data on 
exports and sales at industry level are employed to construct sectoral 
import penetration measures at the SNI92 3-digit level, i.e. the import 
shares from various country groups in consumption. Table 1 shows the 
trends in the import shares and export ratios (export to shipment ratios). 
In Table 1, we observe that Swedish manufacturing is highly exposed to 
international trade. The “old” EU member countries are the most important 
trading partners in terms of both imports and exports. Import penetration 
from Japan and Asian NICs has decreased, while the export ratio of 
Swedish firms to this group has increased slightly. The largest changes in 
import penetration and export orientation over the period 1990-1999 have 
taken place in trade between Sweden and the recent EU member countries. 
However, the distributions of import penetrations and export ratios among 




Table 1.  Import penetration from and export ratios to different 
















EU14 members  0.33  0.37  0.34  0.38 
EU10 recent members  0.01  0.03  0.01  0.05 
Japan and Asian NICs  0.06  0.04  0.02  0.03 
Other high-income 
countries 
0.08 0.09  0.16  0.17 
Other low-income 
countries 
0.04 0.04  0.05  0.07 






                                                 




Table 2.   Product compositions of imports from different   


















15 Food and beverage  0.05  0.07  0.00  0.06  0.09 
16  Tobacco  -  -  - - - 
17  Textiles  0.02  0.05  0.03 0.01 0.10 
18 Wearing apparels  0.02  0.10  0.08  0.01  0.18 
19 Leather, footwear  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.00  0.05 
20 Wood products  0.01  0.06  0.00  0.01  0.02 
21 Pulp and paper  0.02  0.01  0.00  0.02  0.01 
22 Publishing, print  0.02  0.01  0.00  0.02  0.00 
23 Refined petroleum products  0.03  0.06  0.00  0.03  0.07 
24 Chemicals and chemical 
products 
0.13  0.06  0.04 0.12 0.06 
25 Rubber and plastic products  0.04  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.02 
26 Other non-metallic mineral 
products 
0.02  0.03  0.01 0.02 0.02 
27 Basic metals  0.08  0.09  0.01  0.07  0.08 
28 Fabricated metal products  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.03  0.02 
29  Machinery  0.13  0.08  0.10 0.13 0.04 
30 Office machinery and 
computers 
0.05  0.00  0.11 0.07 0.01 
31 Electrical machinery and 
apparatus 
0.06  0.07  0.09 0.06 0.04 
32 Radio, Tele. communication 
 equipment 
0.07  0.06  0.18 0.07 0.07 
33 Medical, precision 
instruments 
0.03  0.01  0.05 0.08 0.01 
34 Motor vehicles, trailers  0.13  0.07  0.12  0.05  0.02 
35 Other transport equipment  0.02  0.01  0.03  0.09  0.03 
36 Furniture, manufacturing 
n.e.c. 
0.02  0.09  0.04 0.02 0.08 
Total  manufacturing  1.00  1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
 
It is also interesting to have a look at the product groups in which these 
trading partners are competing in Swedish market. To give a picture of the 
product composition in the imports, I calculate the import shares in various 
industrial sectors of total manufacturing import from each country group. 
Not surprisingly, it appears from Table 2 that the former EU member 
countries and other high-income countries have quite similar import 




market. However, imports from Japan and Asian NICs are more 
concentrated to a few sectors, such as machinery, electronics and motor 
vehicles, which is different from the previous two groups. For imports from 
the recent EU member countries and other low-income countries in capital-
intensive sectors, there might be some quality and/or price differences 
compared to the imports from the relatively more advanced economies. 
A firm’s mark-up and the impact of import competition may depend on 
the degree of product differentiation in the sector in which the firm is 
active. Therefore, I have divided the industries in manufacturing into high- 
and low-differentiated sectors. The structure taxonomy is based on R&D 
intensity.
14 R&D intensity is taken as a proxy for product differentiation 
and degree of innovation; i.e. the high-differentiated sector consists of 
R&D intensive industries. Table 3 presents some descriptive statistics of 
firms in the high- and low-differentiated sectors. 
The impression we get from the description in Table 3 is that firms in the 
high-differentiated sector are larger, more skill-intensive and less capital-
intensive compared to firms in the low-differentiated sector. Moreover, the 
firms in the high-differentiated sector have higher export ratios, but at the 
same time, they face more intensive import competition. In the other 
words, there seems to be more intra-industry trade in the high-differentiated 




Table 3.   Characteristics of firms in high- and low-differentia-








Employment 382  246  136  (3.73) 
Capital intensity  264  388  -124 (-5.30) 
Skill intensity  0.20  0.13  0.07 (11.70) 
Export ratio  0.46  0.30  0.16 (11.12) 
Import penetration  0.63  0.34  0.29 (31.14) 
Intra-industry trade  0.86  0.45  0.41 (24.43) 




                                                 




4.  Empirical specifications and results 
 
The empirical analysis is carried out in three steps. At first I utilize the 
baseline model in Equation (6) to estimate average mark-ups in Swedish 
manufacturing. After that I include import penetration variables to evaluate 
the pro-competitive effect of import as a disciplinary device on market 
power. Finally, product differentiation is introduced into the model to 
further investigate the differential effects of import competition under 
various market structures. 
 
4.1 Mark-up  estimations 
Based on the discussion in Section 2, I employ the following model to 
estimate average mark-ups during the 1990s for different sectors j at the 
SNI92 2-digit level as well as for the manufacturing as a whole: 
 
ijt t t ijt j ijt Year X Y ε λ β + + ∆ = ∆                                            (7) 
 
Year dummy variables  t Year control for unobserved yearly fluctuations. 
The estimation procedure imposes a constraint that the average price-cost 
margin is constant over time and over firms i within a same industry j; and 
j β  is a fixed parameter. Various econometric techniques are used and 
Table 4 reports the results. 
The estimates of average price-cost margins are robust to different 
estimators. On average, the mark-up in Swedish manufacturing as a whole 
is above 30 percent (β = 0.23). However, there are significant variations 
across different sectors within the manufacturing. We observe relatively 
high mark-ups (over 40 percent) in industrial sectors such as radio, TV and 
communication equipment, publishing and print, refined petroleum 
products, chemicals and chemical products (where pharmaceuticals are 
included), and professional instruments. On the other hand, the mark-ups 
are relatively low (below 20 percent) in leather and footwear, office 
machinery and computers, and furniture and manufacturing not elsewhere 
classified. 
An interesting comparison to make is to look at some earlier studies that 
applied the same methodology. Two such studies are used as benchmarks. 
The first is by Martins et al. (1996), which is based on industry-level data 




Table 4.    Baseline mark-up estimations 
 
  OLS Fixed-effect  Random-effect  Hausman  Number 
  Sector Lerner 
index 
j β  
PCM 
j µ  
Lerner 
index 
j β  
PCM 
j µ  
Lerner 
index 
j β  
PCM 





15-36 All manufacturing  0.23  
[14.75] 
1.30 0.23   
(47.09) 
1.31 0.23   
(53.03) 
1.30 0.56  13220 
15 Food and beverage  0.24  
[13.64] 
1.31 0.24   
(13.54) 
1.31 0.24   
(15.33) 
1.31 1.00  1057 
16  Tobacco    -  -  - - - - -  22 
17 Textiles  0.19  [6.50] 1.23  0.16  
 (6.44 ) 
1.20 0.17   
(7.14) 
1.21 1.00  287 
18 Wearing apparels  0.21  
[2.02] 
1.27 0.14   
(1.31) 
1.16 0.18   
(2.10) 
1.22 0.99  101 
19 Leather, footwear  0.12  
[0.63] 
1.13  - - - - -  21 
20 Wood products  0.19  
[13.04] 
1.24 0.20   
(15.80) 
1.24  - - -  1007 
21 Pulp and paper   0.25  
[6.67] 
1.34 0.25   
(15.54) 
1.33 0.25   
(16.31) 
1.34 0.01  612 
22 Publishing, print  0.31  
[13.13] 
1.45 0.31   
(16.15) 
1.45 0.31   
(17.95) 
1.45 0.89  1307 
23 Refined petroleum   0.44  
[3.58] 
1.78 0.44   
(3.93) 
1.78  - - -  45 
24 Chemicals & chemical   0.34  
[7.56] 
1.51 0.36   
(19.93) 
1.55  - - -  659 
25 Rubber and plastic   0.19  
[4.23] 
1.24 0.21   
(8.35) 
1.26 0.19   
(8.89) 
1.24 0.81  640 




Table 4.  (continued)  
 




1.33 0.24   
(10.18) 
1.32  - - -  501 
27 Basic metals  0.18  
[9.79] 
1.22 0.20   
(9.41) 
1.24  - - -  496 




1.30 0.25   
(14.87) 
1.34 -  -    1397 
29 Machinery  0.19  
[9.45] 
1.23 0.19   
(17.08) 
1.24 0.19   
(18.60) 
1.23 0.01  2104 




1.15 0.17   
(2.96) 
1.20 0.14   
(2.83) 
1.17 0.99  136 




1.34 0.28   
(14.54) 
1.40 0.27   
(14.79) 
1.38 0.00  550 




1.48 0.35   
(10.35) 
1.53  - - -  239 




1.43 0.31   
(6.69) 
1.44  - - -  417 
34 Motor vehicles, trailers  0.20  
[10.48] 
1.25 0.20   
(8.10) 
1.25  - - -  667 




1.20 0.10   
(3.58) 
1.11 0.12   
(4.59) 





1.17 0.14   
(7.40) 
1.16  - - -  691 
Notes: The coefficients are almost identical when the industry dummy variables are included in OLS estimation. Square brackets [ ] give 
White’s heteroskedasticity- consistent t-statistics for OLS regression. Standard errors are also adjusted for potential dependency among 
firms in the same industry. T-statistics and z-statistics in parentheses for fixed- and random-effects estimations. Some of the random-effects 




Table 5.  Mark-up comparisons with earlier studies 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 






15 Food and beverage  1.31  1.23  1.30 
16 Tobacco   -  -  - 
17 Textiles  1.23  1.13  1.35 
18 Wearing apparels  1.27  -  1.35 
19 Leather, footwear  1.13  1.12  1.19 
20 Wood products   1.24  1.16  1.18 
21 Pulp and paper   1.34  1.19  1.41 
22 Publishing, print  1.45  1.15  1.35 
23 Refined petroleum products  1.78  -  1.18 
24 Chemicals and chemical 
products 
1.51 1.17  1.33 
25 Rubber and plastic products  1.24  1.21  1.37 
26 Other non-metallic mineral 
products 
1.33 1.12  1.45 
27 Basic metals  1.22  1.09  1.25 
28 Fabricated metal products  1.31  1.12  1.19 
29 Machinery  1.23  -  1.23 
30 Office machinery and computers  1.15  1.17  1.28 
31 Electrical machinery and 
apparatus 
1.34 -  1.15 
32 Radio, television, 
communication equipment 
1.48 1.30  1.52 
33 Medical, precision instrument  1.43  1.12  1.47 
34 Motor vehicles, trailers  1.25  1.12  1.30 
35 Other transport equipment   1.20  -  1.20 
36 Furniture, manufacturing n.e.c.  1.17  1.05  1.30 
Average mark-up  1.31  1.15  1.30 
 
for two other small and open economies, Belgium and the Netherlands
15, 
using firm-level data.   
Table 5 shows that in general the estimated mark-ups are higher in this 
study of Swedish manufacturing industries in the 1990s than in Martins et 
al. (1996) for the 1980s. The largest differences are found in sectors such as 
pulp and paper, publishing and print, chemicals and chemical products, and 
medical and precision instrument. The average mark-up is about 15 
percentage points higher in Belgium and Sweden in the 1990s than in 
Sweden in the 1980s. One might therefore suspect that analyses based on  
                                                 
15 I do not compare my result with the Netherlands since the number of investigated 




Table 6.  Spearman rank correlation over time and across 
countries 
 





















  Note: Level of significance in parentheses. 
 
industry data give rise to lower estimates on mark-up levels than those 
using firm-level data. However, it is also evident from Table 5 that there 
are notable differences in mark-up levels between sectors in Swedish and 
Belgian manufacturing. To get a clearer picture of structural variations in 
mark-ups over time and across countries, I also compute Spearman rank 
correlations and Table 6 presents the results. 
Table 6 indicates that the structural similarity of mark-ups in Swedish 
manufacturing in the 1980s and in the 1990s is limited; the Spearman rank 
correlation between the two periods is not significant. An interpretation is 
that the manufacturing sectors in Sweden have experienced substantial 
changes in terms of market power/profitability during the period 1980-
1999. Potential sources of these changes are both structural changes in the 
domestic market and the impact of economic integration. Furthermore, we 
notice that the rank correlation of mark-ups in Sweden and Belgium is also 
insignificant. Notwithstanding, Sweden and Belgium are both small open 
economies and members of the EU, the country-specific factors appear to 
shape the market power structures in these countries. 
 
4.2  Effect of import penetration 
Theoretically, import penetration should correlate negatively with the 
mark-ups due to an increase in demand elasticity or a breakdown of 
collusive behaviour among dominant producers in the domestic market. 
To integrate import competition, as well as domestic competition into 
my model set-up, I estimate the following regression on the panel of 









t jt ijt total jt ijt h ijt ijt Year X IMC X H X X Y
1999
1992
1 β β β β  
ijt t t jt total jt h Year IMC H ε γ γ γ + + × + × +                                           (8a) 
jt H  is an employment based Herfindahl index for industries j at the SNI92 
3-digit level and is an indicator of domestic competition. The import share 
in consumption in an industry j,  jt IMC , measures the degree of import 
competition.
16 The price-cost margin is supposed to be reduced by import 
competition and to be large when domestic concentration is high in an 
industry. Thus, we expect  h β  to be positive and  total β  to be negative. The 
interaction terms between  ijt X ∆  and year dummies  t Year  are included in the 
specification to capture year-specific effects that may affect the price-cost 
margins. 
In Table 7a, all four estimators: OLS, robust regression, fixed and 
random effects give the expected negative signs on the coefficient of 
import penetration.
17 The random-effect, which is the preferred estimator, 
yields a significant coefficient of the disciplinary effect of import and the 
point estimate is –0.055. The average import penetration over the estimated 
period 1991-1999 is 0.44. After taking account for the effect of import 
competition, at an average level of 0.44, the Lerner index for the 
manufacturing sector is 0.227 (0.251-0.055x0.44). This implies an average 
mark-up of 1.29; without import competition the average mark-up is 1.33. 
Moreover, the parameter estimate of concentration  h β  has the expected 
positive sign and is significant, which indicates that price-cost margins are 
higher in more concentrated industries. 
The coefficients  t β s capture yearly fluctuations and demand effects. 
Since there were two important institutional events that took place during 
the studied period − the launch of the EU’s internal market in 1992 and 
Sweden’s membership in the EU in 1995 − it is interesting to see whether 
there has been any effect of the internal market and of the EU membership. 
Such effects may be captured by the interaction terms between the year 
dummy variables  t Year  and  ijt X ∆ . Inspection of the  t β  reveals no clear 
decreasing pattern. Put differently, there are year-specific effects associated  
                                                 
16 The variables H and IMC are discussed in more details in Appendix 2. 
17 To check for potential endogeneity problems, I run the same specifications with 






Table7a.  Effect of import penetration on mark-up in Swedish 
manufacturing 1990-1999: Total import 
 


































































































Hausman test  -  -  -  0.66 














12959 12959  12959  12959 
  
Notes: OLS standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and potential 
dependency among firms in the same industry. 
 
 
with the size of mark-ups, but there is no clear-cut evidence indicating that 
these year-specific effects are related to the institutional changes. On the 
other hand, the relatively short time span of this study may not make it 





In Section 3, I argue that the impact of imports on mark-ups may vary 
depending on the country of origin and I proposed that import should be 
divided into five country groups. To allow for differential disciplinary 
effects of imports, I have adjusted the model in Equation (8a). Equation 
(8b) below shows the relevant parts. 
   ∑ ∑
= =





1 . . . . . . . . .
k
ijt jkt k jkt ijt
k
k ijt ijt IMC IMC X X Y ε γ β β            (8b) 
 
where 
jkt IMC  is the share of import from country group k in industry j at 
time t. 
The results in Table 7b suggest that the effects of import penetration do 
vary depending on the origins of imports.
18 The imports from the new EU 
member countries have negative and significant effects in all specifications. 
When I control for unobserved firm-specific effects, imports from the 
former EU member countries and Japan and Asian NICs affect price-cost 
margins negatively as well. 
The imports from other low-income countries do not impose any 
disciplinary effect. On the contrary, the coefficient is positive and 
statistically significant. By inspecting the import composition from low-
income countries in Table 2, we notice that, except labour intensive imports 
such as wearing apparels and footwear, a considerable part of the imports 
from low-income countries belongs to sectors such as petroleum products, 
basic metal and radio and telecommunications. The positive effect on 
mark-ups of imports from low-income countries may imply that these 
imports, rather than price-competing, are cost-reducing for Swedish manu-
facturing firms. One possible explanation is that Swedish firms take 
advantage of low cost components from the low-income imports in their 
production. 
I have recognized that the disciplinary effects of imports differ 
depending on the origins of imports. Another interesting question is 
whether the impact of import penetration may vary due to product 
differentiation. I examine the differential effects associated with product 
differentiation by adapting Equation (8a). 
 
. . . . . . 1 + × ∆ + ∆ + + ∆ = ∆ j jt ijt totdiff jt ijt total ijt ijt Diff IMC X IMC X X Y β β β  
ijt j diff j ijt diff Diff Diff X ε γ β + + + + × ∆ + . . . . . .                                 (9) 
                                                 
18 Estimations with one- and two-year lags of import penetration from different country 




Table 7b. Effect of import penetration on mark-up in Swedish 
manufacturing 1990-1999: Five country groups 
  












































Import Japan and Asian 
NICs 









Import other high income 
countries 









Import other low-income 
countries 









Year dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Hausman test  -  -  -  0.29 








     Overall:  0.52  Overall: 
0.52 
Number of observations  12959  12959  12959  12959 
 
Notes: OLS standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and potential 
dependency among firms in the same industry. 
 
  The dummy variable  j Diff , which equals one if the firm is in a sector that 
produces high-differentiated goods, is a proxy for product differentiation. 
The definition of high- and low-differentiated sectors is given in Section 3. 
The coefficient  diff β  captures a direct effect of product differentiation on 
price-cost margins. The coefficient  total β  measures the effect of import 
penetration in the low-differentiated sector, while the estimate of  totdiff β  




sector. Theoretically, both vertical and horizontal differentiations may relax 
price competition in the market. However, it depends on the relative 
demand elasticity and the degree to which the imported and domestic goods 
are substitutes to each other. We cannot a priori determine the sign of the 
interactive term. A negative sign of  totdiff β  indicates a stronger disciplinary 
effect of imports in the high-differentiated sector, while a positive sign 
suggests a weakened disciplinary effect.
19 
 
Table 8a. Import penetration and product differentiation: Total 
import 
 


































Total import × Product 
differentiation 



















Year dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Hausman test  -  -  -  0.47 












Number of observations  12140  12140  12140  12140 
  
Notes: OLS standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and potential 
dependency among firms in the same industry. 
                                                 
19 As a robustness check I replace the product differentiation dummy variable  Diff  with 
the R&D intensity − the ratio of R&D expenditures to total sales − at industry level. 
Yet, I prefer the dummy variable specification. First, the dummy variable provides a 
more straightforward interpretation. Second, the R&D intensity may induce additional 
measurement errors and endogeneity bias. However, the alternative proxy of product 
differentiation yields similar results. Table A3.1 in Appendix 3 presents the results 




The results in Table 8a from estimating the model in Equation (9), allowing 
for differential impact of import penetration owing to product 
differentiation, show that the disciplinary effect of import appears to vary 
with the degree of product differentiation. The negative and significant 
coefficients of  total β  in the fixed- and random effect models indicate that 
total import imposes a disciplinary effect in the low-differentiated sector. 
However, the positive and significant coefficients of the interaction terms 
between total import and product differentiation  totdiff β  imply that the 
disciplinary effect of import is weaker in the high-differentiated sector. 
When both product differentiation and imports from various country 
groups are explicitly included into the estimated model, as shown by the 
results in Table 8b, the disciplinary effects of imports from the former EU 
members countries, the recent EU members, and Japan and Asian NICs 
remain significant in the low-differentiated sector. However, imports from 
high-income countries do not have any significant effect on price-cost 
margins. The disciplinary effects of imports in the high-differentiated 
sector, indicated by the interaction terms between import penetration and 
the differentiation dummy variable, suggest that the effects imposed by the 
imports from the former EU member countries and the recent EU members 
are weakened substantially in the high-differentiated sector. The imports 
from Japan and Asian NICs and other high-income countries do not have 
any significant effect in the high-differentiated sector. For the low-income 
counties, the effects are positive and significant in both the low- and the 
high-differentiated sectors. 
To get a clearer picture of how price-cost margins are affected by 
imports from different origins and in differentiated markets, I calculate the 
net-effects by using the sample means of import penetrations and 
significant random-effect coefficients in Table 8b above. I report the results 
in Table 9. 
The results shown in Table 9 indicate that the disciplinary effects 
imposed by imports from the recent EU members, the former EU members, 
and Japan and Asian NICs are stronger in the low-differentiated sector than 
in the high-differentiated sector. Perhaps due to large amounts of intra-
industry trade, imports from these country groups do not have any 
disciplinary effect in the high-differentiated sector. This implies, on the one 
hand, that firms from the EU member countries do not have apparent cost 
advantages compared to their competitors in Swedish market. This also 
means, on the other hand that Swedish manufacturing firms manage to 
keep higher prices, through either vertical or horizontal product 





Table 8b. Import penetration and product differentiation: Import 
divided into five country groups. 
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Import EU14 × product 
differentiation 









Import EU10 × product 
differentiation 
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product differentiation 










Import other high-income × 
product differentiation 









Import other low-income × 
product differentiation 













Table 8b. (continued)   
Product differentiation 









Year dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Hausman test  -  -  -  0.29 












Number of observations  12140  12140  12140  12140 
 
Notes: OLS standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and potential 
dependency among firms in the same industry. 
 










































The above results show that Swedish manufacturing firms are able to 
sustain higher price-cost margins in the high-differentiated sector in the 
face of intensive import competition. Nevertheless, the competitiveness is 
not costless. This is indicated by the negative and significant coefficient of 
diff β . We observe that product differentiation does in fact increase costs for 






5. Concluding  remarks 
By applying Roeger’s method to estimate price-cost margins I find that 
Swedish manufacturing firms in 1990s, on average, have a mark-up of 30 
percent. This is similar to the average mark-up levels obtained in previous 
studies based on firm-level data for other small and open economies that 
employ the same estimating approach. Yet there are notable differences in 
mark-up levels in various sectors between countries. 
The excessive profitability levels are indeed affected by competition 
pressure in Swedish manufacturing. First, price-cost margins are reduced 
by the total import penetration. Second, when the total imports are divided 
into country groups, it turns out that the strengths of the disciplinary effect 
vary depending on the origins of imports. The imports from the recent EU 
member countries seem to impose the strongest disciplinary effect. Also, 
the imports from the former EU countries, Japan and Asian NICs and other 
high-income countries appear to have disciplinary effects on mark-up 
levels, although somewhat weaker owing to the intra-industry nature of 
imports from these countries. 
Finally, when product differentiation is taken into account the 
disciplinary effect of import is in general weaker in the high-differentiated 
sector. This is compatible with the theoretical prediction that product 
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The primal analysis 
 
Log-differentiation of the production function in Equation (1) in Section 2 
gives 
 
it iMt it iUt it iSt it iKt it it M U S K A Q ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ α α α α + + + + =                       (A.1) 
 
iJt α  is the elasticity of output with respect to input J, which in turn equals 
the factor J’s share of total cost, i.e.  it it it Jit iJt Q m J w / = α , where  Jit w  is the 
price of factor J and  it m  is marginal cost. 
The mark-up, price over marginal cost, is  it it it m p / = µ  and the share of 
factor J in total revenue  it it it Jit Jit Q p J w / = θ . We can write the cost share of 























=                                            (A.2) 
 
Under perfect competition  Jit Jit θ α = , while imperfect competition implies 
that  1 > it µ  and hence  Jit Jit θ α > . 





= M U S K J
Jit α                                         (A.3) 
 
Using (A.3), substituting (A.2), and adding  it Q
)
 and subtracting  it K ˆ  from 





() = − − − − − − − = it iMt it iUt it iSt it iMt iUt iSt it it M U S K Q SR ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 ˆ θ θ θ θ θ θ  
( ) ( ) it it it it it it K Q A ˆ 1 ˆ 1 ˆ 1 1 1 − − − − − − + µ µ µ                                        (A.4) 
 
A common measure of market power, which is closely related to the mark-






















                         (A.5) 
 
We replace the mark-up with the Lerner index in (A.5) and obtain: 
 




The dual analysis 
 
The cost function that corresponds to firm i’s production function in 




it iMt iKt i
it it iMt iUt iSt iKt i A
Q w w G
A Q w w w w C
. . . ,
, , , , , =                   (A.7) 
 
and the marginal cost function is: 
 






. . . ,





Log-differentiation of (A.8), making use of Shepard’s lemma, which 
means that () it it it J i Q A J w G / / = ∂ ∂ , and total cost  it it it it A Q G C / = , we get the 
following expression: 
 
Mt iMt Ut iUt St iSt Kt iKt it it w w w w A m ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ α α α α + + + + =              (A.9) 
 
Assuming constant mark-up over the period t implies: 
 
it it m p ˆ ˆ =                                                          (A.10) 
 
Replacing  it m ˆ  with  it p ˆ , using (A.3) and substituting (A.2), adding  iKt w ˆ  
and subtracting  it p ˆ  from both sides of Equation (A.9) gives the price-based 
Solow residual  it SRP : 
 
() = − + + + − − − = it iMt iM iUt iUt iSt iSt iKt iMt iUt iSt it p w w w w SRP ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 θ θ θ θ θ θ  
( ) ( ) it it iKt it it it p w A ˆ 1 ˆ 1 ˆ 1 1 1 − − − − − − + µ µ µ                                        (A.11) 
 
By replacing the mark-up with the Lerner index from (A.5) we get: 
 







Appendix 2    Definition of variables, panel 




Rental price of capital 
 
Following Hall and Jorgenson (1967) the rental price of capital in firm i in 
industry j at time t is derived: 
 
( ) [ ] jt it t t ijt p i R * δ π + − =  
 
t i : Long-run nominal interest rates proxied by yields on public sector 
bonds of 10 years maturity. 
t π : Expected inflation rate. 
it δ : Firm-specific rate of depreciation. 
jt p : Industry-specific deflator for fixed business investment. 
 





















































The depreciation rate for building 
B δ  is 3 percent and 11 percent for 
machinery 
M δ . 
k
jt p  are industry-specific deflators for building and 






Measurements of competition 
Domestic competition 
Herfindahl index:  ∑ = =
N
i ij j S H
1
2 , where  ij S  is the market share in term of 
employment of firm i in industry j. By using data on employment from 
RAMS (Register-based labour market statistics) I can calculate the 
Herfindahl index for the period 1990-1999 where all Swedish 
manufacturing firms are included. Herfindahl index based on production, 
which contains all firms, can only be calculated for the period 1996-1999. 
However, the employment- and production-based Herfindahl indexes are 
strongly correlated (0.96) for the period 1996-1999. 
 
Import competition 
Import penetration ratio: import as a fraction of domestic consumption. 




Table A2.1  Panel information 
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Appendix 3  Additional results   
 
 
Table A3.1  Import penetration and product differentiation: R&D 
intensity as a measure of product differentiation 
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intensity 
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R&D intensity 
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× R&D intensity 





















income × R&D 
intensity 










income × R&D 
intensity 



















Year dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Hausman test  -  -  -  0.00 
      Within: 0.57  Within: 0.57 
2 R   0.53    Between: 0.32 Between: 0.33 
      Overall: 0.53  Overall: 0.54 
Number of 
observations 
12140 12140  12140  12140 
 
Notes: OLS standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and potential dependency 
among firms in the same industry. R&D outlays are from the financial accounts of 
enterprises. 
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